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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. V. CHRISTENSEN: A CLASS 
ACTION CLAIM CAN TOLL THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL, UNNAMED MEMBERS 
OF THE CLASS AS LONG AS THE DEFENDANT IS 
PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NOTICE. 
By: Andrew Burnett 
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a class action claim can toll the statute of limitations for 
individual unnamed members of the class as long as the defendant is 
provided with sufficient notice. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340 (2006). More specifically, 
the defendant must have notice of the "substantive claims" asserted 
against them, as well as the number and "generic identities" of 
possible plaintiffs. Id. at 256, 905 A.2d at 357. The second issue the 
Court addressed is whether granting summary judgment was 
appropriate for petitioner. 
On August 13, 2001, Nona Christensen ("Ms. Christensen") in her 
capacity as the representative of her deceased husband, Russell 
Christensen ("Mr. Christensen"), brought a survival and wrongful 
death action against Philip Morris USA, Inc. ("Philip Morris") and 
other manufacturers of cigarette products. The action was also 
brought against Giant Food, LLC ("Giant") and others involved in the 
distribution and sale of cigarette products. With the exception of 
Giant, the defendants in the case at bar, ("petitioners"), were in a prior 
class action suit filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 
Christensen, 394 Md. at 232, 905 A.2d at 343 (citing Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000)). 
The claims against the petitioners in the class action were asserted 
on behalf of all Maryland residents who suffered from physical 
injuries or disease caused by tobacco products, and who pled nicotine 
addiction as their injury. Although Mr. Christensen was not a named 
plaintiff, he did provide an affidavit on behalf of the named plaintiffs, 
discussing his smoking habit and his lung cancer. The circuit court 
issued a Class Certification Order, but the Court of Appeals of 
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Maryland, on June 15, 2000, issued a writ of mandamus directing the 
circuit court to vacate its Class Certification Order. 
As a result, Ms. Christensen filed the action at issue here on behalf 
of her husband. On September 4, 2003, petitioners moved for 
summary judgment arguing that all of Ms. Christensen's claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court granted the 
motion, rejecting the argument that the statute of limitations was tolled 
by the pendency of the Philip Morris class action. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment as to all 
petitioners except Giant, which was remanded to determine when Mr. 
Christensen was put on inquiry notice of his claims against Giant and 
whether summary judgment would be proper. Philip Morris petitioned 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of certiorari, which was 
granted. 
Upon granting certiorari, the Court considered two issues. First, in 
a matter of first impression, the Court sought to determine whether the 
statute of limitations for the filing of individual suits is tolled by the 
pendency of a class action. Christensen, 394 Md. at 231, 905 A.2d at 
341. 
In rejecting petitioner's argument that the Court's precedent 
precluded judicial recognition of a tolling exception such as those 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & 
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland pointed to Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 
Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966). Christensen, 394 Md. at 235-37, 905 
A.2d at 345-46. In Bertonazzi, the Court determined the pendency of 
an action filed in an incorrect venue tolled the statute of limitations for 
claims against a decedent's estate. Christensen, 394 Md. at 236, 905 
A.2d at 345. The Court in Bertonazzi stated that even though time 
would be extended, the purpose of the statute of limitations was still 
being served. Christensen, 394 Md. at 238, 905 A.2d at 346-47. 
Defendants would still be assured that claims asserted after evidence 
had disappeared would be unjust. [d. 
The Court in Bertonazzi went on to note that two conditions must 
be satisfied to toll the statute of limitations. Christensen, 394 Md. at 
238, 905 A.2d at 347. First, there must be persuasive authority or 
policy considerations supporting the tolling exception. [d. Second, 
the tolling exception is consistent with the purposes of statutes of 
limitations. [d. Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
previously analyzed cases under the Bertonazzi two-part test, the Court 
in the instant case sought to clarify the circumstances under which a 
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tolling exception would be applicable. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 
A.2d 340. 
When a Maryland rule is patterned after a federal rule, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has always found federal case law persuasive. 
[d. at 253, 905 A.2d at 355-56. In particular, Maryland Rule 2-231 is 
modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Christensen, 394 
Md. at 253, 905 A.2d at 356. As such, the Court found the reasoning 
in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 
756 (1974) particularly persuasive. Christensen, 394 Md. at 253, 905 
A.2d at 356. 
In American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of the putative class 
action and the statute of limitations does not resume until class 
certification is denied. Christensen, 394 Md. at 253, 905 A.2d at 356 
(citing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 
756 (1974)). The Court reasoned tolling was necessary in order to 
promote judicial efficiency and economy. Christensen, 394 Md. at 
253-54, 905 A.2d at 356. The tolling exception protects individuals 
involved in class action claims and eliminates the need to file 
separately. [d. However, American Pipe pertained to members of a 
putative class who were making motions to intervene after class 
certification was denied. Christensen, 394 Md. at 248, 905 A.2d at 
354. This is different than the case at bar which involves a subsequent 
claim by Ms. Christensen as an individual member and not as an 
intervener. [d. 
As such, the Court in the case at hand also relied on Crown, Cork & 
Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (1983). Christensen, 
394 Md. at 249, 905 A.2d at 353. The Court in Crown, Cork & Seal, 
held that the statute of limitations is tolled for the individual claims of 
class members in the same way the tolling in American Pipe applied 
for intervenors. Christensen, 394 Md. at 254-55, 905 A.2d at 356-57. 
Refusing to extend the rule to individual members could shorten the 
time a class member has to file an action if certification is denied, 
whereby claimants are left without an action in which to intervene. [d. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland went beyond the requirements 
set forth in American Pipe, and held that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendants are notified of "not only the substantive claims 
being brought, but also of the number and generic identities of the 
potential plaintiffs." Christensen, 394 Md. at 256, 905 A.2d at 357 
(citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 767). The Court 
emphasized that to benefit from class action tolling, the individual suit 
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must "concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the 
subject matter of the original class suit." Christensen, 394 Md. at 256, 
905 A.2d at 357 (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 562, 94 S.Ct. at 
770 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
Petitioners argued that even if the Court recognizes a tolling 
exception in class action suits, it should, based on a lack of 
commonality, make an exception for causes of action arising out of a 
"mass-tort" incident. Christensen, 394 Md. at 257, 905 A.2d at 358-
59. However, the Court rejected this argument by noting that a lack of 
commonality does not necessarily mean the defendant had a lack of 
notice of the substantive claims of every putative class member. [d. 
Therefore, the Court stated there is no reason to have a per se 
exception for mass-tort cases. [d. 
The only further question to be decided was whether Philip Morris 
received adequate notice of Ms. Christensen's claims. [d. at 266, 905 
A.2d at 363. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
petitioners had adequate notice because the class action complaint 
defined the plaintiff class as "all Maryland residents who have 
suffered or continue to suffer from physical injuries or disease caused 
by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco ... " Christensen, 
394 Md. at 266, 905 A.2d at 364 (quoting Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 
700, 752 A.2d at 206). Therefore, because Mr. Christensen also 
provided an affidavit and testified at a deposition regarding his history 
of smoking and lung cancer, "there was no question" that Philip 
Morris had adequate notice of his claims. Christensen, 394 Md. at 
266, 905 A.2d at 364. 
The second issue the Court addressed is whether the circuit court 
was correct when it granted summary judgment in favor of Giant. [d. 
at 268, 905 A.2d at 365. Giant was not a defendant in the class action 
against Philip Morris, and therefore, class action tolling was not 
applicable. [d. at 268, 905 A.2d at 356. However, there is a dispute 
between the parties regarding the timing of Mr. Christensen's cause of 
action arising from his lung cancer. [d. Accordingly, the Court 
remanded the issue to the circuit court for reconsideration in light of 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59,904 A.2d 511 (2006). 
[d. at 269, 905 A.2d at 364. The Court in Georgia-Pacific held, with 
respect to asbestos, a claimant should have knowledge of a claim when 
he has been diagnosed with mesothelioma and the claimant has 
knowledge of exposure to asbestos. Christensen, 394 Md. at 269, 905 
A.2d at 365. As such, the trial court will have to make factual 
determinations consistent with these factors to determine if Ms. 
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Christensen has a cause of action against Giant arising from Mr. 
Christensen's use of tobacco products. [d. 
Maryland courts now recognize the pendency of a class action suit 
will toll the statute of limitations for putative class members so long as 
the claims are the same and the defendant has adequate notice of the 
putative class member who is benefiting from the tolling exception. 
Therefore, if class certification is denied, individual members may 
bring a separate action without being barred by the statute of 
limitations, so long as the claim is timely filed after the denial of 
certification. 
